













This paper examines the effects of inter-school competition on student outcomes by using 
exogenous variation in the availability of private schools in Chile. Given that naïve 
estimates of the effects of competition on student outcomes are biased by endogenous 
entry of schools, this paper uses variation in the number of Catholic priests per capita in 
different school markets, as an exogenous determinant of the supply of private schools. 
Results suggest that greater competition significantly raises both test scores and the 
productivity of schools. There is also evidence that the effects of school choice are 
significantly larger for students attending subsidized private schools, and insignificant or 
even negative for students attending public schools facing softer budget constraints.  
                                                 
* I would like to thank the Ministry of Education of Chile for providing most of the data used in this paper, 
especially Mauricio Jélvez and Claudia Matus.  2  
1. Introduction 
Extending school choice has been one of the most debated topics in recent years 
in the public arena and in the Economics profession (for references, see Hoxby, 2003; 
Ladd, 2002; and, Neal, 2002).  Regarding analytical issues, almost everything has been 
proposed. On one extreme we have models suggesting significant productivity effects of 
more choice (creating competitive pressures on schools that might be behaving as local 
monopolies). On the other extreme, some papers stress markets imperfections and predict 
increased segregation without significant increases in school quality. Regarding empirical 
research, some papers analyze the effect of attending private vs. public schools using 
exogenous variation to identify random assignment to each school (e.g. Angrist et al., 
2002). Other papers have focused on the effects of inter-school competition as a measure 
of school choice on productivity (e.g. Hoxby, 2000).  
In this paper, I will follow and extend the second line of empirical research, 
studying the effect of inter-school competition on education outcomes in Chile using data 
for 2002. Chile is interesting because it is the only country having the whole K-12 sector 
operating under a “quasi-voucher” system for a long period of time (since 1981). This has 
created a sizeable publicly-subsidized private sector that serves roughly one third of 
students.  Moreover, private enrollment varies significantly among different school 
markets (i.e. geographic areas). This source of variation will be used in this paper to 
measure the effects of choice on educational outcomes. 
However, as discussed below, there are some conditions for a proper operation of 
a voucher scheme that has not been implemented in Chile so far. Namely, agents 
(teachers and administrators) operating publicly-owned schools do not have a clear link 
between school outcomes and their welfare (i.e. their income and employment), as 
assumed in a ideal voucher scheme. Moreover, most public schools seem to operate 
under a “soft budget constrain”. That is why I called the system, a “quasi-voucher” 
scheme. Subsidized private schools are closer to an ideal voucher system, where school 
budgets and welfare of agents are related to enrollment and, therefore, they should react 
strongly to the incentives provided by vouchers. These differences will be exploited to 
analyze if the effects of choice depend on differences in incentives structures of schools.  3  
Methodologically, the most important challenge is that naïve estimates of the 
effects of competition on student outcomes are biased by potentially endogenous entry of 
schools in areas having low school quality. To overcome this problem, I will extend 
previous work by Hoxby (1994), by using the number of Catholic priests per person by 
school market as an instrument for private school enrollment (my proposed measure of 
inter-school competition, see below), after controlling for the size of the Catholic 
population. The basic motivation is that a Catholic priest is linked with a parish, which in 
general has attached a school. This creates a source of exogenous supply of private 
schools in different areas, given that about 40% of Chilean private schools are Catholic. 
Both qualitative and quantitative evidence is provided in order to give some support for 
the identification strategy. Moreover, by controlling for the share of Catholic population I 
am taking in account direct effects of this variable on educational results (as suggested by 
an incipient research on the effects of religions on a number of variables, e.g. Barro and 
McCleary, 2003). Thus, this improves the identification strategy of Hoxby (1994), which 
uses religious affiliation in different areas as an instrument, and, therefore, may violate 
exclusion restrictions.  
Another methodological challenge is distinguishing between changes in school 
behavior related to productivity and in student populations. So, following Hoxby (2000), 
I will control for (i) mean and standard deviation of mother education at the class, school, 
and market levels as proxies for student’s characteristics, peer effects, and market effects, 
and (ii) interactions of the proposed measure of competition and heterogeneity of students 
characteristics.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Chilean 
education sector and previous research. Section 3 presents a succinct theoretical 
motivation, the equations to be estimated and a detailed description of the identification 
strategy. Section 4 presents data, basic results, and some robustness checks. Section 5 
briefly concludes. 
 
2. Primary and secondary education in Chile 
A simple way of describing the K-12 sector is by comparing its characteristics 
before and after the 1981 reform. Previous to the reform, the central government was  4  
involved in the funding and production of education; supervision and regulation of 
curriculums; handling of human resources; and investment. The 1981 reform changes that 
situation. Public education was transferred from the central government to the 
municipalities (local governments); private and public schools started to receive a per-
student subsidy (voucher) depending on enrollment; parents were free to choose among 
any publicly-financed school; and would-be schools were free to enter in the market.  
Thus, publicly-funded education in Chile is organized in a mixed scheme, with 
private and public schools receiving transfers accordingly to established rules. That is the 
main difference with the pre-reform period when public financing to private schools was 
minimum and discretional.
1 Three types of schools emerged: Publicly owned schools 
(managed by local governments), subsidized private schools, and unsubsidized private 
schools. The first two kinds of schools receive the per-student subsidy. The latter does 
not receive public money, charges high tuitions and is focused in upper income students. 
In addition, there are important differences between public and private schools in 
terms of incentive structures and external resources. Public schools work under “softer” 
budget constraints: when needed, public schools losing students receive transfers beyond 
and above the voucher to pay schools’ expenses (Sapelli, 2003). Regarding teacher 
regulations, teachers in public schools can not be easily removed from their positions. In 
short, at least for some public schools, budgets and agents’ incomes are actually fixed 
and do not depend on enrollment, creating what I would call the key missing incentive 
mechanism in the Chilean voucher system.  
Another point related to the voucher scheme is that the per-student subsidy is 
almost invariable in student characteristics. As argued by Hoxby (2001), if the cost of 
educating students is decreasing in, say, mother education (as a proxy of “pre-school” 
student characteristics) and the public subsidy is flat, schools may compete for students 
with better backgrounds, driving away the rents created by them. Alike, parents would 
demand more intensely schools providing better peers. This point highlights the 
importance of controlling for peer-group effects in empirical analyses. 
                                                 
1 Notice that a group of free private schools did receive public funding, but the amount of resources was 
small and discretional.  5  
Although the main elements of the 1981 reform have remained constant, there are 
some relevant developments to be mentioned. First, while the per-student subvention 
dropped 55% in real terms from 1982 to 1990; it has increased by an average of 6% real 
each year from then on.
2 Second, there was little public information on school quality 
available for parents until the mid 1990s, afterwards test scores have become hugely 
available (from the late 1990s, they are available on the Ministry of Education webpage). 
Third, with local governments not democratically elected during the 1980s, there was 
little local pressure to improve public school quality. Fourth, from 1990 on, the 
government channeled additional resources to “vulnerable” schools, increased non-
voucher spending, created rigidities in the teachers market, and allowed to some 
subsidized schools to charge co-payments. Finally, since the mid 1990s, the government 
started some programs assigning resources based on educational results.  
In terms of empirical research analyzing the Chilean reform, a number of recent 
papers use datasets containing student information and show an advantage of subsidized 
private schools over public schools, after controlling for student characteristics (e.g. 
Contreras, 2002; Sapelli and Vial, 2002 and 2003). However, no paper uses a valid 
source of exogenous variation for the assignment of students to schools. Most research 
uses the availability of different schools as instruments. But, exclusion restrictions are 
violated if school choice (i.e. the availability of schools) has a direct effect on outcomes. 
Other research has tried to identify effects of school choice (using private 
enrollment as a measure of inter-school competition) on student outcomes. Here results 
are controversial. On the one hand, Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) and McEwan and Carnoy 
(1999) find negligible effects of competition. Hsieh and Urquiola present regressions for 
municipality-level outcomes for the 1980s. McEwan and Carnoy (1999) present OLS 
estimates using a panel of schools with information from the 1980s to the mid 1990s. On 
the other hand, Gallego (2002) present IV-estimates using information at the school level 
for 1994-1997 and finds significant effects of competition.  
Differences in results come from two facts. The first is the time period included in 
regressions. It is hard to argue that the 1980s was a period when some basic conditions of 
                                                 
2 Notice that this is very important because the per-student subsidy was supposed to cover operational 
expenses and, therefore, the drop was probably associated to a significant decrease in the quality of 
subsidized schools.   6  
the voucher system were implemented (i.e. the significant drop in subsidies, no 
information available, absence of local pressures). The second difference has to do with 
data aggregation. Hsieh and Urquiola use aggregate data because they claim that by doing 
so can better disentangle between selection and productivity effects.
3 Gallego (2002) use 
school data because he claims that there is a lot of intra-market variation in outcomes.
4 
This difference matters because running aggregate regressions wastes a lot of information 
on individual and school level heterogeneity (Hoxby, 2000). But, the cost of analyzing 
individual effects is that peer-group and market effects have to be taken carefully in 
account. For doing so, individual information is crucial.  
It remains a more fundamental identification problem in available estimates of the 
effect of competition for the Chilean case (Hoxby, forthcoming). Papers identify the 
exogenous variation in private enrollment by using differences in population sizes and in 
urbanization rates among geographic areas. Even though, over-identification tests are not 
rejected, it might be the case that (i) what we are observing is migration related to 
education, and therefore, population sizes would be endogenous to pre-reform school 
outcomes (Hoxby, forthcoming) and (ii) both variables can have direct effects on school 
quality, because they may be capturing idiosyncratic characteristics of cities that may 
have direct effects on education results.
5 Given the limitations of over-identification tests, 
some more credible identification strategy is needed. This paper will try to do so. 
 
3. Proposed model and identification strategy 
This section starts by briefly presenting the rationale for expecting (or not) effects 
of choice on school behavior and outcomes. The basic idea for expecting significant 
effects is an agency problem between schools (administrators and teachers) and parents 
(students). Along the lines of Manski (1992), let us assume that schools maximize rents 
(equal to the difference between total expenses and expenses valued by students). Parents 
pick the school that maximizes students’ welfare (that depends on expenses valued by 
them). Introducing school choice (i.e. more options) lowers the cost of moving students 
among schools and/or releases information about the true productivity of schools (Hoxby, 
                                                 
3 This claim depends on the particular functional form for peer-group effects that they use. 
4 For instance, the intra-cluster correlation at the school market level of 2002 test scores is only 0.065.  
5 Glaeser and Mare (2001) show that there seems to be greater skill accumulation in urban areas.  7  
1994). In order to keep enrollment, this produces an increase in schools’ expenses of 
resources valued by students, as long as their budgets depend on enrollment. If not, there 
are little incentives for them to change behavior (or, even, there may be perverse effects 
of losing students: having a fixed budget with fewer students increases schools’ rents; 
Sapelli, 2003). Thus, the response of schools to choice depends on the interaction among 
their objectives, and their incentives structure (linking enrollment and budget).  
There also exist arguments questioning the effects of choice on school quality, 
especially for students coming from poorer families (see Carnoy, 1997 and Hsieh and 
Urquiola, 2003 for details). Poor families would not care about educational quality 
received by their children. There would not be suitable information on schools quality. 
There would exist high costs of moving students and low mobility, which would create 
local monopolies, limiting the effect of choice.
6 Assuming (which is, in general, not 
explicit in most papers) that it is cheaper to improve quality by selecting better students 
than by increasing effort or efficiency, more inter-school competition could even produce 
negative effects on some students because of selection effects.  
As theoretical arguments may go either way, I will empirically evaluate both 
points of view for the Chilean case by analyzing the relationship between a measure of 
school choice and academic outcomes, after controlling for socioeconomic-variables at 
the class, school, and market level. In terms of empirical specification, following Hoxby 
(1994 and 2000), the equation to be estimated is: 
(1)  icsm m m m sm csm icsm m icsm Y X X X X C H ε ϖ ρ κ σ β α π + + + + + + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ ,  
for student i in class c, school s, and educational market m. H is some student outcome, C 
is a (potentially endogenous) measure of competition in market m, X is a measure of pre-
school characteristics of students (e.g. mother education),  X ˆ  is a vector including the 
mean and standard deviation of X grouped by classroom, school, and market, Y are some 
exogenous variables,  m ϖ is unexplained schooling market outcome (see below for its 
rationale), and ε is a student-specific error term.
7 
8 
                                                 
6 However, Hoxby (1999) points out that what really is needed for creating incentives is that at least a 
fraction of students are on the move at any given time. 
7 The calculation of standard errors in (1) should reflect the fact that we are using multiple observations of 
variables in classrooms, schools, and markets that are not independent. This problem is solved by using  8  
  An initial empirical challenge when estimating (1) is how Cm is measured. First, a 
definition of school market is needed. In this paper, I make use of about 280 
municipalities and the Greater Santiago as proxies for local educational markets. This 
choice is motivated by the fact that with the exception of municipalities in the Greater 
Santiago, the overwhelming mass of students attends schools in the town where they live 
(Gallego, 2002; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003; and Sapelli and Vial, 2002). Second, I need a 
measure of school choice in each market.
9 To do that, I use the information provided by 
the share of private schools in total enrollment in a market (i.e. students enrolled in 
private schools over total enrollment). Considering that the number of public schools has 
remained roughly constant since the reform and that most entry in the post-reform period 
comes from private schools, variation in private enrollment quantifies availability of 
schools in different areas. Putting differently, a higher ratio of private enrollment 
identifies an area where more students are in the margin between different schools.
10 
A second, more fundamental, challenge is that Cm may not be exogenous. To 
makes things clear, let us assume that the reduced form of the determinants of the private 
enrollment share is: 
(2)  m m m m m m Y X Z C ν φϖ θ δ + + + + = ˆ ,  
where Z is some exogenous determinant of Cm, and ν is a market-specific error term. The 
way the potential endogeneity of Cm is modeled is by assuming that the demand for 
private schooling is a decreasing function of  m ϖ  because the demand for private schools 
should be larger in areas with bad pre-existent public schools (Hoxby, 1994). Thus, (1) 
and (2) imply that  0 ) , cov( ≠ + icsm m icsm H ε ϖ . Therefore, OLS estimates of π are in general 
inconsistent. The direction of the bias depends on φ, which is negative by assumption.   
                                                                                                                                                 
corrected standard errors, as proposed by Moulton (1986). This correction allows each classroom, school, 
and market to have a random effect (which is not presented in (1) for shortness sake). 
8 In addition, as shown in Hoxby (2000), when estimating (1) using IV methods and including 
heterogeneity in each school as a dependent variable, it is necessary to include in equation (1) interactions 
of Cm and average school heterogeneity by market (using the interaction of Zm and average heterogeneity 
by market as instrument). These terms encompass the way choice interacts with market heterogeneity to 
affect school heterogeneity. 
9 The fact that we are using an imperfect measure of competition is an additional motivation for using an IV 
strategy for estimating equation (1). Hoxby (2000) discusses cases when non-classical measurement error 
may produce OLS estimates that are not only biased, but also present the wrong sign. 
10 Thus, hereafter I mean school choice when I talk of inter-school competition, private enrollment, or 
private competition.  9  
Next, I need some theory of how the degree of private enrollment varies among 
markets. I am looking for some exogenous source of variation in the share of private 
enrollment in different markets (i.e. Zm in eq. 2). To do so, I use variation in priests per 
person among different areas, after controlling for the share of Catholic population. This 
variable attempts to capture exogenous differences in the supply of private schools. As 
previously mentioned, a significant share of private schools in Chile is Catholic and, from 
the past, the work of Catholic priests and missionaries has been strongly related to 
education.
11 The involvement of priests in education has been understood as a key 
element of their religious mission.
12 In general, priests founded parishes that had attached 
a school. Thus, most Catholic schools seem to share infrastructure, fixed costs, and 
personnel with other (mostly confessional) activities.   
What is interesting about Chile is that, despite the majority of the population 
being Catholic (all other denominations represent less than 10%), there is substantial 
variation in the number of priests per people in different areas. While the average school 
market has a ratio of about 0.16 priests per 1,000 people, the market with the higher ratio 
(0.23 priests per 1,000 people) has more priests per person than most Latin American 
(and, overwhelmingly Catholic) countries; and the market having the lowest ratio (0.06 
priests per 1,000 people) is comparable to what is observed in a poor (and non-Catholic 
country) such as Kenya.  
This has to do with the fact that characteristics of Catholic dioceses seems to be 
highly specific to individual bishops and other church leaders and the prominence of the 
religion order that is managing the district. On the one hand, most Chilean dioceses were 
assigned to different orders when they were established. These groups have different 
numbers of priests available to be sent as workers. On the other hand, the number of 
religious vocations (and, therefore, priests) in an area seems to depend on particular 
aspects of the personality of the bishop. In addition, differences in priests per person have 
                                                 
11 In a broader context than Chile, I would have also mentioned the role of missionaries of other religions in 
expanding education (see Woodberry, 2003). However, in Chile this does not apply because non-Catholic 
missionaries, and especially their presence in the education sector, are not very significant.  
12 For instance, in a document defining the role of a Catholic school, Garrone (1977) states that “The 
Church establishes her own schools because she considers them as a privileged means of promoting the 
formation of the whole man, since the school is a centre in which a specific concept of the world, of man, 
and of history is developed and conveyed”.  10 
historical roots; the correlation of priests per capita during the 1990s and the 1950s is 
0.61 (for a sub-sample of dioceses having data in both periods).
13  
In order to study, at least indirectly, the validity of the identification strategy, two 
empirical exercises were conducted. First, Table 1 presents cross-country regressions 
showing that countries having more priests per capita have a larger share of private 
enrollment in schools, after controlling for a number of covariates (namely, 
denominational variables).
14 This result is a sort of international generalization of the 
assertion that, controlling for Catholic affiliation, the availability of priests is correlated 
with private school enrollment and, therefore, giving empirical support to the theory 
motivating the proposed instrument and putting it in a broader context than the Chile.  
Second, Table 2 presents results coming from regressions showing that the ratio 
of priests per capita does not seem to be related in a significant way with other 
socioeconomic outcomes in Chilean municipalities, controlling for covariates of Zm 
included in (2). Dependent variables are proxies for municipality-level variation in health 
conditions (infant mortality), level and variability of income, and security (violent 
crime).
15 This evidence gives some indirect support to our exclusion restriction (that Zm 
has no direct effect on student outcomes above and beyond its effect on Cm), therefore 
ruling out the worry that priests per-capita might be capturing some omitted characteristic 
of area that may affect student outcomes. 
 
4. Data and results 
  The outlined empirical strategy requires data on students’ education outcomes, 
their backgrounds, and the characteristics of the area where they attend school. Data on 
academic outcomes come from the 2002 SIMCE test that was applied to 4
th graders.
16 
This test is applied nationwide since 1988 to most than 90% of students of the relevant 
                                                 
13 Given the historical roots of this variable and the relationship with availability of schools, our proposed 
instrument might also be capturing historically given differences in the propensity to enroll students in 
private schools in different areas. 
14 I will focus my discussion on the effects of priests per capita for brevity sake. In general, signs of other 
covariates are consistent with results in papers analyzing them in detail.  
15 In addition to including violent crime as a measure of security, the motivation for including it is adding a 
proxy for social capital. I do not have data on traditional measures of social capital, but there seems to be a 
significant relationship between social capital and violent crime (Lederman et al., 2002).  
16 I will use the 2002 test because it is the only year for which I have individual measures of education 
outcomes, family background, and private and public expenses in each student education.  11 
grade. I will use the average of the Math and Spanish portions of the test (standardized to 
have an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) as measure of academic outcomes.  
  Regressions were run also using as dependent variable a measure of productivity. 
The productivity index is computed as the ratio of test scores and (the log) of total 
expenses related to each student education, as proposed by Hoxby (2000).
17 Total 
expenses include both private and (the largest part of) public expenses in each student 
education. Data on private expenses come from a survey on parents of students taking the 
SIMCE test and reflect household expenditure in each student education (up to miss-
reporting). The per-student subsidy was computed by applying to each school the 
relevant formulas published by the Ministry of Education (the subsidy depends upon 
whether the school is located in an urban/rural area, the kind of education it provides, and 
the level of student co-payment, among other factors). Computing public non-voucher 
expenditure was more difficult because there are various public expenses, especially for 
public-owned schools. I include the two major sources of additional expenditure for 
primary schools: transfers which are not included in the per-student subsidy, and 
participation in the two most important public programs targeted to complement the per-
student subsidy (the P-900 program targeted at the worst performing schools and the 
MECE program focused in funding pedagogical innovations). Data on non-voucher 
transfers come from the Chilean Municipal Dataset available at http://www.sinim.cl/ and 
data on the P-900 and MECE programs come from several publications of the Ministry of 
Education. Notice, that however the measure of expenditure is imperfect; it accurately 
includes the majority of expenditure (namely, private expenses and the per-student 
subsidy). 
  Data on socioeconomic background of students come from the survey on parents. 
Students’ socioeconomic background is measured using educational attainment of their 
mothers.
18 I use five categories measuring mothers schooling (having attained at most 
primary education, secondary general education, secondary technical education, post-
secondary technical education, or college or postgraduate education).  
                                                 
17 Using total expenses (instead of the log of total expenses) has no significant impact on results. 
18 I will focus in mother education because it is the variable more used in the literature and because other 
variables (such as family income and father education) are highly collinear with mother education. 
Qualitative results do not change when including those variables or replacing mother schooling with them.  12 
Data on private enrollment are drawn from the Ministry of Education enrollment 
files. As previously mentioned this variable was measured as the ratio of private 
enrollment to total enrollment in each school market. Data on priests per person and the 
share of Catholics in each Chilean diocese come from www.catholic-hierarchy.org.  
Observations on 138,858 and 210,187 students are available for estimation 
purposes for productivity and test scores, respectively. Selected descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 3. A couple of comments about these statistics. First, the average student 
attends a school in a market where private enrollment is about 40%, but there is a lot of 
variation. Second, the average school market has about 0.16 priests per 1,000 people and 
the average school market has a share of Catholics close to 75%, with the minimum being 
close to 55% and the maximum close to 95%. Thus, there is variation in variables related 
to the identification strategy. Finally, heterogeneity is higher at the class-room and school 
levels than at the market level, suggesting at least some sorting at disaggregated levels. 
Table 4 presents results for an OLS regression of private school enrollment as a 
function of our suggested instrument and other covariates (i.e. the first stage of equation 
1). Catholic priests are significantly related to the share of private enrollment in a market. 
One standard deviation of the number of priests per person boosts private enrollment by 
about 8 percentage points. Results regarding other covariates suggest that private 
enrollment is higher in areas with more educated households and more inequality in pre-
school characteristics (as in Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003). Somewhat surprisingly, the share 
of Catholics presents an insignificant, but negative, effect on private enrollment. 
Traditional explanations argue that the higher the share of Catholics in an area, the higher 
the demand for Catholic schools (Hoxby, 1994). However, a potential explanation is that 
there is another effect going in the opposite direction: Catholics living in areas where 
affiliation to the Church is relatively low are not able to affect the way public schools 
teach as strongly as in markets where they are the overwhelming mass (e.g. in the latter, 
parents are almost sure that teachers are Catholic), and therefore need to settle their own 
schools. Finally, the F-statistic on the excluded instrument is 28.21, suggesting that it is 
not weakly correlated with Cm.  13 
As initial motivation for our IV-results, Table 5 shows results of reduced form 
estimates for the model.
19 
20 For both measures of student outcomes, Catholic priests 
have a significant and positive effect on academic results. Socioeconomic variables at the 
student level present expected effects: the more educated the mother, the higher the test 
score and the productivity index. Estimates for peer-group effects suggest that classrooms 
having students with more educated mothers have better academic outcomes and that the 
variability of the same variable is insignificant, after controlling for variability at the 
school and market levels. Finally, the effect of Catholic affiliation is negative for both 
measures, but marginally insignificant for productivity.
21 
Table 6 presents IV-estimates. Let us begin by analyzing the bottom of the table. 
OLS effects of private enrollment on student outcomes are negative but insignificant 
confirming previous results using OLS or a potentially invalid identification strategy 
(McEwan and Carnoy, 1999; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003). However, IV estimates are 
positive and statistically significant. The contrast of OLS and IV estimates by using a 
Hausman tests (presented at the bottom of the table), suggests that OLS estimates are 
inconsistent. Second, IV estimates for both measures imply that the effects of inter-school 
competition are positive and significant. One standard deviation in private enrollment 
generates about 0.20 standard deviations in test scores and 0.24 standard deviations in 
productivity. Results for other variables are qualitatively similar than for reduced form 
estimates. 
Results are obtained after controlling for students’ socioeconomic background 
and classroom, school, and market characteristics, so it is highly unlikely that peer-group 
effects are not controlled for in these regressions. Moreover, results also suggest that 
effects of more private competition not only affect measures of test scores (output), but 
                                                 
19 In all results presented I will show only estimates for the effects of competition, Catholic affiliation, and 
student and classroom socioeconomic variables. I do that for brevity sake and because either the other 
variables were statistically insignificant or are hard to interpret (mainly because of collinearity among 
them). As the focus of this research is not on peer-group effects, the other variables are included to improve 
the fit of the equation and to isolate the effect of choice of peer-group effects (as in Hoxby, 2000).  
20 The units of the productivity index are not intuitive, thus in all regressions for productivity I show in 
square brackets each coefficient as a share of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
21 Different results for the effect of the share of Catholics on tests scores and productivity may reflect the 
above-mentioned fact that Catholic schools share some costs with other activities or that they receive 
private transfers which are not included in the productivity index.   14 
also how effectively output is produced. The last point is relevant because it implies that 
more choice is beneficial for students without requiring higher expenses.  
In a further test of the importance of incentives provided by school choice to 
agents operating schools, it still remains analyzing if the effect of choice depends upon 
differences in incentives faced by dissimilar schools. As previously discussed, qualitative 
evidence suggest that public schools operate under a “softer” budget constraint than 
private schools. This issue is analyzed in detail in Table 7. The first and second rows 
show estimates of the effects of private enrollment on educational outcomes for students 
attending public and subsidized private schools, respectively. Interestingly, point 
estimates suggest that effects of school choice for students attending public schools are 
significantly lower than for students attending private schools. Actually, more choice 
does not seem to affect in a significant way test scores and productivity for students in 
public schools. This evidence brings support to the claim that if competition and choice 
do not translate into much pressure to teachers and school administrators, schools have a 
much smaller response to competition.  
However, given that students attending subsidized private schools are relatively 
richer and come from better family backgrounds than students attending public schools 
(Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003), a potential questioning of previous results is that there are 
heterogeneous effects of choice (competition) depending on household characteristics. 
This issue is analyzed in the next four rows of Table 7. In the estimates, I allow the 
effects of competition to differ for students who come from low-income and low-
education and not-low-income and not-low-education families. For the purpose of the 
analysis, low-income and low-education households are those that live in a household 
belonging to the lower quarter of the distribution of income and mother education in their 
education market. Not-low-income and not-low-education households are all others. 
Notice that households are classified relative to their markets’ income and education 
because the main reason for considering heterogeneous effects of choice is that the 
effects of competition depends on household differences within a school market (Hoxby, 
2000). Results provide little evidence of heterogeneous effects of competition; estimates 
of interaction effects are statistically insignificant both for test scores and productivity.  15 
These results can be explained by schools specializing in different groups of students and 
suggest that there are benefits of school choice for students in all socioeconomic groups. 
To further test if the lack of incentives is relevant for explaining the very small  
effects of inter-school competition on public schools, the seventh and eighth row of Table 
7 presents interaction effects of our measure of competition and an indicator variable for 
schools having “softer” budget constraints. This indicator variable takes a value of 1 if 
the student attends a school located in areas with “non-voucher” public transfers located 
in the highest quarter of the distribution of this variable. Results show that for students 
attending schools with softer budget constraints, the marginal effect of private enrollment 
is significantly negative and, even, the total effect is negative and marginally significant 
(p-value of 0.059 and 0.074 for test scores and productivity, respectively). These results 
present some evidence for perverse effects of more private competition for those schools 
faced with more choice and very lenient budget constraints, as previously discussed.  
For a second time these results might be mistrusted by using the argument that it 
might be the case that school choice produces stronger productivity effects in richer and 
more educated municipalities. Indeed, some areas receiving more non-voucher public 
transfers are also areas having low income and schooling.
22 The last four rows of table 7 
analyze this issue. I constructed indicator variables for students living in areas where 
family income and schooling were located in the lowest quarter of the distribution of each 
variable. Results of interacting school choice and the indicator variables for poor and less 
educated areas are insignificant. Thus, this evidence suggests that there are no 
heterogeneous effects considering now the poorer and less educated school markets, and 
brings additional support to my claim that different incentive schemes is what is driving 
heterogeneous effects for students attending different schools. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Results in this paper shed some light on the effects of expanding school choice 
and help to derive some general properties that might be helpful for thinking about 
reforms. First, Chilean students seems to have received a significant benefit of choice in 
                                                 
22 The correlation of non-voucher transfers per student with per-capita income and average schooling in 
each municipality is -0.16 and -0.30, respectively.   16 
terms of increased productivity and test scores, controlling for own characteristics, peer-
group effects and school market characteristics. Second, the effects are smaller for 
students attending public schools than for students attending subsidized private schools. 
This is especially true for students attending schools having relatively softer budget 
constraints. This is very suggestive evidence that school choice need to have financial 
consequences if it is to produce the expected effects. Third, there is no much support to 
the claim that students having different social backgrounds benefit in a different manner 
of more school choice. Finally, these results do not intend to mean that selection or 
segregation are not relevant issues in the Chilean case, but that controlling for 
characteristics of students and peers, there are sizeable direct effects of competition.  
The last point is crucial for policy implications and proposals of reforms and it is 
at the heart of recent discussions about the Chilean experience with quasi-vouchers. 
Various authors have shown that the Chilean system seems to have produced some 
segregation (e.g. Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003); however, results in this paper imply that 
letting segregation constant, more choice improves student outcomes for the schools 
having the right incentives. Thus, if a government wants to correct segregation it is not 
necessary to damage school choice, but to use the right incentives. For instance, as recent 
proposals of letting per-student subsidies depend on student characteristics, along the 
lines of Hoxby (2001); or mandating subsidized schools to have lottery-based allocations 
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Table 1: Cross-country regressions for private school enrollment 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Dependent variable:  



































Share of Other Religions













R-square 0.452  0.457  0.457 
Number of countries  34  34  34 
Notes: Constants not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Column (1) presents results of a regression 
including average years of schooling as a measure of development, column (2) incorporates income per-capita as 
measure of development, and column (3) uses both variables.  
 
Table 2: Municipal level regressions for selected socioeconomic variables 





















































R-square 0.878  0.662  0.166 0.053 
Number of 
municipalities 
285 285 208  271 
Notes: Constants not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
                                                 
a Source: James (1993). 
b Source: www.catholic-hierarchy.org . 
c Source: Barro and Lee (2001). Measured as average years of schooling of the adult population. 
d Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank. Size of government is measured as the share of government 
expenditure in total GDP. 
e Source: The World Factbook, CIA. The omitted category is the share of Muslims in total population. 
f Source: Own calculations based on the survey on parents of students taken the 2002 SIMCE test (see the data section 
for more details about the survey). 
g Source: Various household surveys, see http://www.ine.cl/21-regiones/sociales.htm. Violent crime rate is defined as 
the ratio of reported violent felonies to total population in each municipality.  19 







Test scores  0.000  1.000  -2.970  2.542 
Productivity index  0.010  0.091  -0.285  0.256 
Mother schooling 
Highest level of schooling attended is         
Primary 0.341  0.474  0.000  1.000 
Secondary, General  0.299  0.458  0.000  1.000 
Secondary, Technical  0.148  0.355  0.000  1.000 
Post-secondary, Technical  0.093  0.290  0.000  1.000 
College or higher  0.119  0.324  0.000  1.000 
Total Years of Schooling of the mother  9.993  3.823  1.000  26.000 
School market variables related to the identification strategy 
Private enrollment  0.416  0.192  0.000  1.000 
Share of Catholics in total population  0.752  0.067  0.564  0.951 
Priests per 1,000 people  0.159  0.043  0.061  0.232 
Measures of heterogeneity of students (using years of schooling of the mother) 
Standard deviation at the:         
Classroom level  3.092  0.785  0.000  13.435 
School level  3.015  0.597  0.000  13.435 
Market level  3.582  0.287  1.155  5.066 
 




Dependent Variable:  
Share of Private School Enrollment in Total Enrollment at 
the Market Level 
Priests per 1,000 people 
1933.967 
(364.123) 
Share of Catholics in total population 
-0.174 
(0.134) 
Mean of mother schooling 
0.049 
(0.008) 




Number of observations  285 
F-test on excluded instrument is 0  28.21 
Notes: Constant not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  20 
 
Table 5. Reduced Form Regressions for Student Outcomes 
 Dependent  Variable 





















































R-squared 0.228  0.229 
 
Sample size (classrooms) [schools] {markets}  210,187 (9304) [5887] {285}  138858 (6555) [4235] {256} 
Notes: This table presents estimates for the effects of some variables included in the reduced form of student outcomes 
(equation 1). Constants are not reported. Standard errors presented in parentheses are computed using the Moulton 
(1986) correction for grouped data. The numbers in square brackets show each coefficient estimate as a share of a 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The omitted category for schooling of mothers is having attained at least 
college education.  21 
 
Table 6. IV-Estimates for Student Outcomes 
 Dependent  Variable 


























































Hauman-test: OLS vs. IV estimates. P-value, null 
hypothesis is true. 
0.012 0.007 
Notes: This table presents estimates for the effects of some variables included in equation (1). Same sample size as in 
table 5. Constants are not reported. Standard errors presented in parentheses are computed using the Moulton (1986) 
correction for grouped data. The numbers in square brackets show each coefficient estimate as a share of a standard 
deviation of the dependent variable. The omitted category for schooling of mothers is having attained at least college 
education. 
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Table 7. IV-Estimates for Effects of Private Enrollment on Student Outcomes. Additional exercises 
 
 Dependent  Variable 
  Test scores  Productivity index 
Same specification as in Table 6, students in public 






Same specification as in Table 6, students in 







Same specification as in Table 6 and private enrollment interacted with students from low-income households 





     Additional effect for students coming from low- 






Same specification as in Table 6 and private enrollment interacted with students from low-schooling households 





     Additional effect for students coming from low- 






Same specification as in Table 6 and private enrollment interacted with a dummy for students attending schools having 
a soft budget constraint 





     Additional effect for students attending schools 






Same specification as in Table 6 and private enrollment interacted with a dummy for students attending schools located 
in the poorest areas 





     Additional effect for schools located in the 






Same specification as in Table 6 and private enrollment interacted with a dummy for students attending schools located 
in areas with low human capital 





     Additional effect for students living in areas with 






Notes: This table only presents IV estimates of the effects of private school enrollment on student outcomes when 
estimating equation (1). When interactions of private enrollment and other variables are included, the interaction of 
priests per person and the new variable is used as instrument. Constants are not reported. Standard errors presented in 
parentheses are computed using the Moulton (1986) correction for grouped data. The numbers in square brackets show 
each coefficient estimate as a share of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
 
 